This article addresses a general problem in media sociology -how to understand the media both as an internal production process and as a general frame for categorising the social world -with specific reference to a version of this problem in recent work on media within Bourdieu's field-based tradition of research (work previously reviewed by Rodney Benson in Theory and Society 48). It argues that certain problems arise in reconciling this work's detailed explanations of the media field's internal workings (and the interrelations of that field's workings to the workings of other fields) and general claims made about the 'symbolic power' of media in a broader sense. These problems can be solved, the author argues, by adopting the concept of metacapital developed by Bourdieu himself in his late work on the state, and returning to the wider framework of symbolic system and symbolic power that was important in Bourdieu's social theory before it became dominated by field-theory. Media, it is proposed, have meta-capital over the rules of play, and the definition of capital (especially symbolic capital), that operate within a wide range of contemporary fields of production, and this level of explanation needs to be added to specific accounts of the detailed workings of the media field. The conclusion points to questions for further work, including on the relative strength of the state's and the media's metacapital which must be carried out through detailed empirical work on a global comparative basis. 
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this journal, media attracted considerable attention in the 1990s not so much from Bourdieu himself as from his research associates, particularly Patrick Champagne. 4 One reason, perhaps, for this limited dialogue is an underlying historical and theoretical tension between Marxist-influenced Anglo-American accounts of media power directed at the media's ideological impacts on the whole of society and Bourdieu's tradition of field-based research that is hostile precisely to general theorising about social space. 5 For that reason, there is no simple basis of exchange between recent Bourdieu-inspired work on media and other better-known theorisations of media and media power.
This is worth explaining in a little more detail, in order to contextualise the extended version of Bourdieu's field theory proposed in this article. If the influential 1970s and 1980s British and American tradition of critical media sociology approached the media's contribution to social reality through ideology 6 , arguing that the media reproduce and disseminate ideological contents originally generated elsewhere (above all, the state), the causal relationship between media-channeled ideology and people's beliefs proved elusive; 7 in any case, this work told us little about the status of media institutions themselves in society generally or in specific sectors of social life. 8 By contrast, postmodern social theory 9 did address the impacts of media institutions on social structure, but only through suggestive pronouncements, rather than empirically grounded detail, so there is no basis of reconnection with Bourdieu's work here. Within a third perspective, Luhmann's systems model of 'the reality of the mass media' 10 offers (in its own terms at least) a rigorous account of how media work within social reality, but one which excludes ideological effects. The truth or falsity of specific media representations 5 is irrelevant according to Luhmann, 11 who concentrates on the broad functional interrelations between media 'system' and social 'system', thereby obscuring precisely the contingencies underlying the media process that are most ideological: the tendency for this person or thing, rather than that, to be heard or seen. So while in its respect for the internal workings of media as a productive system Luhmann's work has something in common with Bourdieu, the former's neglect of issues of conflict and power moves as far as possible from the political commitment of the latter, who in this respect is much closer to Anglo-US ideology critiques.
Bourdieu's own work on media and that of researchers close to him could not insist more strongly on the wider social and political consequences of the media process. The result has been some of the boldest criticisms of 'media culture' in any tradition, a further reason for the recent unpopularity of such of its work (mainly Bourdieu's On Television and Journalism) as has reached audiences in Britain and the US, where sweeping criticisms of contemporary media have in some quarters become unfashionable. Take this remark from that book: 'one thing leads to another, and, ultimately television, which claims to record reality, creates it instead. We are getting closer and closer to the point where the social world is primarily described -and in a sense prescribed -by television'. 12 The French version is more vivid: 'on va de plus en plus vers des univers ou le monde social est décrit-prescrit par la télévision. La télévision devient l'arbitre de l'accès à l'existence sociale et politique' . 13 The hybrid word 'décrit-prescrit' captures, if polemically, the naturalising effect of an institutional sector which generates the very categories through which the social world 14 is perceived: a classic Durkheimian point. 6 Similarly bold comments on the 'symbolic power' of the media, particularly television, are found in the work of Champagne, as we shall see (section 1b below). The question, however, on which this article focuses is whether these bold statements are theoretically compatible with the field-theory of media, the latter being the only developed theory of media that Bourdieu and linked researchers have offered. As that theory stands, they are not.
While we come later to the virtues of field-based media research (section 1(a)), there is also something paradoxical about it, at least viewed from other media research traditions, in that it avoids both a general account of the impacts of media representations on social space and a detailed account of media audiences. Its explanatory dynamics are located entirely in the internal workings of the journalistic field or in the specific connections between those internal workings and the operations of other fields which come into contact with it. The result is often to extend in interesting ways Anglo-US work on the sociology of media production. 15 The cost, however, is a tension (section 1(b) below) between the avoidance of theoretical issues that arise outside the field model and the bolder judgements about media that its proponents, probably justifiably, want to make.
This tension is linked to a wider division in Bourdieu's work between his early, less fieldfocussed, work on symbolic systems and symbolic power (see section 1(c)) and his later work on fields. This is not so much a problem, as a genuine theoretical crux, since we are back here to the original difficulty for all theorisations of media with which this article began. Hence resolving the tensions of field-based accounts of media, as this article tries 7 to do, by drawing on Bourdieu's theorisation elsewhere of the state's social power (see section 2), has dividends, not only for our appreciation of the continuity of Bourdieu's work, but also for rethinking some of the aporias of 1970s and 1980s Marxist work on media ideology. It is ironic, no doubt, to be arguing -a quarter of a century since the heyday of Althusserian theories of the media's role among the 'ideological state apparatuses' -that the way forward for contemporary media analyses is via a linkage between Bourdieu's divergent theories of the media field and the state (Bourdieu himself having clearly turned his back on Althusserian models). 16 The difference, however, between the argument developed here and earlier Anglo-US approaches to media/ state is that, first, we will build on the achievements of Bourdieu's own sociology with its rejection of crude totalising accounts of power from 'the centre' and, second, we will seek in doing so to draw on the Durkheim-inspired insights into symbolic power elsewhere in Bourdieu's work. As to the latter Durkheimian tradition, including
Bourdieu's own attempt to fuse Marx and Durkheim, it has been ignored in Anglo-US media sociology, with only a few exceptions. 17 It is necessary to clarify, first, how the term 'media' will be used. By 'media' here is meant the media which, until recently, have been assumed to be society's 'central' media -television, radio and the general press. True, this cuts across a valid distinction between 'central' media and media more specialised in their audience, but this is necessary if we are to begin to address the dimension of media most challenging for field theory:
precisely the broader social impact of 'les médias de grande diffusion' 18 , both within and beyond specific fields. 19 True, this leaves to one side arguments about whether new 8 media (particularly the Internet and media digitalization) will undermine or simply refashion the social centrality currently attributed to television, radio and the press. 20 But this simplification is justified tactically for two reasons. First, it reflects the focus of media research in the Bourdieu tradition which has not to date analysed new media.
Second, there are good reasons to be sceptical about how fundamentally new media, especially the Internet, are changing patterns of media consumption, let alone people's orientation to media as sources of social legitimacy. 21 The conclusion, however, returns to this and other broader issues raised by the analysis.
The Incompleteness of the Media Field
There is little doubt that, as a sphere of cultural production, the media can prima facie be analysed as a single field, or a collection of fields, (each) with a distinctive pattern of prestige and status, its own values. Indeed, according to Bourdieu, the media's intermediate position between the cultural and economic poles of the wider cultural field
gives it a particular interest as a field. This section notes the positive contribution of field theory to media analysis, before identifying a key tension in its treatment of media power.
(a) The Media as Field(s)?
In the course of the 1990s, Bourdieu's research associates produced a number of illuminating studies of the workings of the 'journalistic field' (champ journalistique) or 'media field' (champ médiatique), both terms being used, although the former is more 1. the journalistic field has always occupied a pivotal role in the field of cultural production, because of its specific role in circulating to a wider audience the knowledges of other, more specialised fields. As such, the journalistic field faces contradictory pressures from economic (heteronomous) and cultural (autonomous)
forces.
2. In the 1980s and 1990s a combination of factors (including challenges to Le Monde's legitimacy as the main representative of 'serious' journalism and the increasing legitimacy of television, as a mode of popular journalism) led to an increasing influence of television over press journalism and the increasing predominance of economic influences in the media field as a whole.
3. The increasing heteronomy of the media field has had profound effects on other fields of cultural production through the specific form which their relations to the media field have come to take: an increased influence of television news criteria within journalism has increased the susceptibility of those other fields to external (economic)
pressures, reducing their autonomy as fields and increasing their reliance, specifically, on the media field. The other way in which field research has contributed to our understanding of media is accounts of the changing interrelations between the media field and other fields of cultural production (3. above). These have been discussed in detail by Rodney Benson, 24 , so will not be repeated here; they include studies of media's influences on the intellectual field, the judiciary and the medical field. Together they build a rich, historically nuanced, picture of the increasing influence in many fields of a generalist, economically driven journalism. These accounts rely not on any general notion of ideology, but on specific analyses of how the changing internal dynamics of the journalistic field (for example, struggles for dominance between specialist medical press and general news journalists) mesh with the dynamics of those other fields (for example, the emergence of new spokespersons and interest groups in and around the medical field): see for the medical 11 case Champagne and Marchetti's work discussed further below. It is clear that much is gained by breaking down otherwise highly general claims about 'media power' into specific, historically researchable questions about how external factors (the increasing economic pressures on media production) 'are "translated" by the internal logic of the news media field (and then, how this translated logic is translated into other related fields)'. 25 There are, however, limitations to the field theory model developed in this work. As
Benson argues, there is an ambiguity about what exactly is the source of the 'external factors' influencing the media field and the balance within those external factors of economic (market) and political (state) forces; this ambiguity relates to an ambivalence about how to analyse the state itself. 26 This affects how one can read the direction of influence between the media field and other fields (such as the medical field), given that economic and political forces affect each in quite specific ways.
This article, however, will be concerned with a different issue, namely the implications of the type of influence which field research posits from the media field to other fields. How fields interrelate has always been a difficult question for a research programme whose first concern is always with the internal workings of particular fields. 27 To understand field interrelations field theory has relied on the notion that sets of fields change in tandem through 'homologies' between their internal operations, but as Swartz points out 'homology' just defers explanation to the question of what forces drive the actors in those fields. In Bourdieu's earlier work, this was above all 'habitus', 28 but, given the bias of 12 habitus towards influences from long-standing dispositions, it is much less clear what underlying mechanism field theory has at its disposal to explain the convergences of sets of fields in a fast-changing economic and cultural environment. 29 So far this problem is a general one. The two next sections specify more clearly what is at stake here, linking to broader questions of symbolic power which cannot be contained within the framework of field theory.
(b) Specific Problem Cases for a Field Theory of Media
I want first to show, more directly, that using field theory as an exclusive framework of explanation creates difficulties, or gaps, in Bourdieu's and his research associates' account of the media.
Let's turn to Bourdieu's main explicit treatment of the media, the two television talks collected under the title On Television and Journalism. 30 This book has been criticised for some of its more sweeping generalisations about the way media represent the social world (their 'trivialisation' of it). I am not convinced by these criticisms, particularly
given the background of empirical work on media fields on which Bourdieu implicitly relied. My interest instead is with the gap between Bourdieu's detailed discussion of how the media field(s) operate as fields of production and his reference to the overwhelming 'symbolic power' of television. Implicitly the gap is filled by the convergences assumed between changes within the journalistic field (television's increasing dominance, with its 13 greater susceptibility to economic influences translated through appeals to audience ratings) and changes in other fields (their increased openness to relations within the journalistic field). But how exactly does this convergence work?
There must be some causal mechanism that explains how what actors in particular nonmedia fields do is changing. There is more than one type of explanation that could fill this gap in relation to any one non-media field: (1) specific factors (for example, an increasing dependence on markets or audiences reachable only through media) that make media coverage of increased importance to actors in that particular non-media field; (2) specific factors making media coverage more important to actors in a range of related non-media fields (for example, the pressures from the state to make various types of service politically 'accountable', as currently in the educational or health fields); or ( journalists and politicians 'react' to a version of public opinion which they have largely constructed, through the framing of questions for opinion polls, the reported reactions to those polls' results, and through the influence of journalists' accounts of politics. The same circular logic constrains those outside the political hierarchy who might otherwise break through it; two decades after Baudrillard, 35 but with much greater sociological authority, Champagne 36 argues that demonstrations are often created for the media, as a means of communicating through, and therefore on the terms of, the media.
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There is much that is interesting here, but the question again is its theoretical we repeated this move in explaining all non-media fields and their relation to media. The result would be either to fuse all fields influenced by media into a single 'journalisticcultural field' or to generate a whole parallel set of hybrid 'journalistic-specialist' fields (medical, political, and so on) each with its own version of 'media capital'. Either way, the strength of the field model -its differentiation of the specific dynamics of particular fields -would have been blunted. 16 The difficulty can be illustrated further by returning to Champagne and Marchetti's analysis of the changing interrelations of media and medical fields around the AIDS crisis in late 1980s France. 42 Our concern here is solely with the way the causal interrelation of these two fields is theorised. 43 What is striking in Champagne and
Marchetti's discussion is a dissonance between their detailed explication of the changing dynamics of, respectively, the subfield of medicine-focussed journalists and the medical field, and their very bold statements about 'the growing omnipresence and power accrued to the media and particularly television'. 44 Their analysis of the latter is concerned particularly with the ability of television to define and then generally impose a particular definition of the medical 'scandal' which cut across older, more nuanced and scientifically accountable definitions of medical news: Such symbolic power legitimates key categories with both cognitive and social force 52 and is defined 'in the very structure of the field in which belief is produced and reproduced'. 53 This power, although it is relevant to the way certain types of capital are constituted as symbolic capital in the context of particular fields, is relevant also to the wider field of power, and indeed social space as a whole. How exactly the media's symbolic power in this broad sense should be theorised consistently with field theory is, as we shall see, illuminated by Bourdieu's late writings on the state. Bourdieu calls 'symbolic systems'. In an early lecture on 'symbolic power' 55 Bourdieu used the term 'symbolic system' to describe both the university system and much earlier religious systems which each had authority to classify social space as a whole. Behind this lies Bourdieu's original Durkheimian notion that religious institutions exercise a 'monopoly of the legitimate exercise of the power to modify . . . the practice and worldview of lay people'. 56 A version of this idea pervades Bourdieu's whole sociology of education; it is present also in his interesting essays on 'rites of institution' and 'symbolic power', 57 which were developed in part with reference to societies without highly complex differentiations of labour. 58 Crucially the concept of symbolic systems (having been developed before fields came to dominate Bourdieu's research agenda) implies an explanatory framework which cuts across field theory. For a 'symbolic system' is a structure of misrecognition that works precisely because of its pervasiveness across social space, because of its totalising force. 21 Is it possible that the gaps we found in field theory-based accounts of the media can be addressed by using concepts (such as symbolic system), which are not tied to the 72 His answer strikingly centres on the notion not so much of field, but of capital:
The The state acts directly on the infrastructure of all fields: it is 'the site of struggles, whose stake is the setting of the rules that govern the different social games (fields) and in 24 particular, the rules of reproduction of those games'. 74 Put another way, the state influences the hierarchical relationship or 'exchange rate' 75 between the fundamental types of capital at stake in each individual field (for example, economic versus cultural capital). 76 This power of the state is, crucially, not derived from the workings of any specific field, even if it is quite possible to think of the immediate space of competition between, say, civil servants as a 'field' in its own right. As to the scope of this power, it presumably includes, although Bourdieu does not mention this specifically, influence over what counts as 'symbolic capital' in each particular field. The concept of 'symbolic capital' in Bourdieu generally means any type of capital (economic, cultural, and so on) that happens to be legitimated or prestigious in a particular field, 77 but the concept of metacapital introduces the possibility that definitions of prestige within specific fields may be determined by influences outside those fields, specifically the state's metacapital.
By analogy, I want to propose that we understand media power also as a form of 'metacapital' through which media exercise power over other forms of power. This gives clearer theoretical shape to Bourdieu's own most interesting insights about the media.
When Bourdieu discusses the increasing pressure of television on, say, the academic field, 78 there is of course a direct economic dimension (a large television audience means more books sold), but television exerts also, he suggests, an indirect pressure by distorting the symbolic capital properly at stake in the academic field, creating a new group of academics whose symbolic capital within the academic field rests partly on their appearances on television. There is no reason to suppose this type of shift occurs in just one field and not other fields; on the contrary, it is plausibly occurring widely across the 25 whole field of specialist production fields, so that we need an overarching concept such as 'meta-capital' to capture it.
Immediately, the question arises how these two types of metacapital -the state's and the media's -interrelate: I return to this in the conclusion. For now, let us concentrate on how the media's own metacapital might work, in particular how it might interact with the conditions obtaining in specific fields. Why assume that its influence is limited to specific fields of production? Just as the state's influence on cultural capital and prestige through the school system (part of what Bourdieu refers to as the state's meta-capital) is not confined to specific fields but radiates outward into social space generally, so the media's meta-capital may impact on social space through the general circulation of media representations. All actors in specific fields are likely also to be actors in general social space and general consumers of media messages. This suggests that the media's metacapital over specific fields might operate in two distinct ways: first, as Bourdieu explicitly suggests for the state, by influencing what counts as capital in each field; and second, through the media's legitimation of influential representations of, and categories for understanding, the social world that, because of their generality, are available to be taken up in the specific conflicts in any particular field. The second type of influence would take us into the media's agenda-setting role across many specific areas of life, 79 and the media's role as the 'frame' within which the generality of social 'issues' get expressed and settled. 80 Should we indeed understand the media as affecting the habitus of individual agents in all fields -a more radical causal link between media and what goes on in particular fields? 81 Clearly to pursue this would require an article in itself. 26 Instead, let us concentrate on the first, more direct, way of understanding how the media's meta-capital might work.
We might understand the media as altering what counts as symbolic capital in particular fields through its increasing monopoly over the sites of social prestige. Indeed, by
altering in parallel what counts as symbolic capital in a range of different fields, media may affect the 'exchange rate' between the capital competed for in different fields (Bourdieu makes just this point in relation to the state's meta-capital). This is quite consistent with Bourdieu's point that capital is only realised by agents in specific forms in specific fields. 82 The symbolic capital (among, say, chefs) that derives from doing a successful television cookery series is not necessarily convertible into symbolic capital in a very different field, such as the academic field; this is because the former need involve few, if any, of the specific attributes valued by media in representatives of the latter. But this does not make the parallel structural transformation by media of the conditions operating in all fields any less significant, nor rule out the possibility that media-based symbolic capital developed in one field can under certain conditions be directly exchanged for symbolic capital in another field. So in Britain recently a well-known television gardener has quickly become a successful popular novelist; clearly this depends the pole of the field of cultural production (mass production or specialist) to which you are closest. Even so, the relationship between media as institutions and all other fields (from politics to the visual arts to sport) has been transformed, when being a player in the former has a significant chance of bringing with it influence over the terms on which people acquire symbolic capital in the latter. When the media intensively cover 27 an area of life for the first time (in the past decade, gardening or cooking), they alter the internal workings of that sub-field and increase the ambit of the media's meta-capital across the social terrain. This is one important way in which over time media institutions have come to benefit from a truly dominant concentration of symbolic power ('symbolic power' in the strong sense, of a power over the construction of social reality).
It is important to emphasise, however, that this analysis does not supersede the accounts of the journalistic field discussed in section 1, any more than Bourdieu's concept of the state's metacapital rules out analysing government bureaucracy in terms of a field of those who work for the state. The wider implication, however, of Bourdieu's work on state power, which I am extending to media power, is that in contemporary, highly centralised societies certain institutions have a specific ability to influence all fields at once. This links Bourdieu's field theory more explicitly with his other work on symbolic power and symbolic systems, for what is at stake at the level of metacapital is precisely the type of definitional power across the whole of social space which the latter concepts capture.
There is much of course that could be said further to justify the idea that media have metacapital of this sort; I have tried to develop elsewhere a linked argument based on detailed qualitative research. 83 Instead, before concluding, let me look briefly at how this theoretical idea might be empirically tested.
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Ways forward for Empirical Research
There are a range of questions which could be asked about how the media's meta-capital is, or is not, progressively altering the operating conditions in any particular field of production: These questions, in effect, continue Bourdieu's interest in 'the production of belief', 90 but apply it across all fields and their interrelations. We need to study the categories (in a Durkheimian sense) through which an increasingly pervasive 'mediatization' 91 of public and private life may be becoming normalised, even legitimated.
Conclusion
This article has developed in theoretical terms a proposal for supplementing existing field-based accounts of the media's operations with an analysis of the media's metacapital over all fields and social space. The aim has been to open up possible answers to questions unresolved in purely field-based accounts of media. The aim has also been to show how, by a modest extension of the field-based model that draws on the rest of Bourdieu's conceptual framework, we can more satisfactorily deal with the difficulty of 31 explaining media as both production process and symbolic system with which the article began.
There remain, however, some unsettled theoretical questions. First, what is the relationship between the media and the state, and their respective meta-capitals? Leaving aside the possibility that we should see the media as part of the state, 92 which seems confusing at best, this difficult question can be only be taken forward through empirical explorations which (as Loic Wacquant has suggested for the state itself) need to be brought together on a global, comparative basis. 93 They will involve detailed analysis of how the state and media compete as reference-points for defining key terms in specific fields: one example might be the definitions in play in the regulation of crime, where the media's impacts on perceptions of the 'crime problem' are attracting increasing attention from sociologists. 94 Second, what is the relationship between the media's and/or the state's meta-capital and that, potentially, of other central social institutions -the educational system, religious institutions, corporate power? We might even want to conceive of Bourdieu's field of power entirely openly as a space where media, state and these other institutions compete for definitional power (metacapital) over specific fields. The unanswerability of such questions here is not, however, a fault of the preceding analysis, but an example of the continued stimulation which Bourdieu's field model can provide to new forms of empirical research on the workings of media power.
